FOOT & MOUTH: A PREVENTABLE  DISASTER

A month before foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) was “discovered” in England in January Irish farmers had been warned to improve their biodiversity to prevent FMD being spread. Also in February the EU voted to test the potency of emergency vaccine stocks, while the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  (MAFF) had contacted timber merchants to ascertain the availability of railway sleepers from which to make funeral pyres.

Since mid-February 2001 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) spread across the British Isles and on to Ireland, France and the Netherlands. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) said the disease appeared to have spread from a farm at Heddon-on-the Wall in North East England and a possible cause was feeding infected swill to pigs. Virus from this source spread from sheep sent to seven other farms in Tyne and Wear. Sheep from one of these farms were sent to Hexham market on 13^th February and from there to markets at Longtown, Cumbria from whence they were dispersed between 14^th and 24^th February.

From Longtown market, sheep were sent to Carlisle on 16^th  February, Welshpool on 19^th February and subsequently to dealers at Highampton, Devon; Lockerbie, Dumfries and Galloway; Dearham, Cumbria; Nantwich, Cheshire; and indirectly to markets at Hatherleigh, Hereford, Northampton and Ross on Wye.  This spread took place until 23^rd  February before  infection was detected and before movement restrictions were imposed.  Even then, the attempt was half-hearted and substantive response was not made until after 21^st   March when experts publicly stated that the outbreak was out of control.

However, there were persistent rumours that the outbreak started at least a month before. David Owen, of Farmers First, took 400 sheep on his ferry to France on 31^st January that subsequently tested positive and he recalls lambs from south Wales being unfit to export in October 2000. Sheep on the Scottish borders showed signs consistent with foot and mouth in early January 2001. There have been suggestions that the epidemic was caused by MAFF inspectors who visited infected farms or markets, spreading the disease, and an even more astonishing claim that a phial of foot and mouth virus went missing from a MAFF laboratory before the epidemic.

FMD was already endemic in the Middle East (one million sheep died), Africa (particularly Kenya and South Africa) and India (said to be threatening the extinction of the white rhino). While countries like the USA, Australia and New Zealand have strict import controls and checks on imported foodstuffs, in the UK such checks were almost totally lacking. According to one report, up to 10 tonnes of illegal meat is brought into Heathrow airport each day, much of it from countries suffering from FMD[1].

In May, a total of 1522 vets from the State Veterinary Service were deployed in tackling the disease. 1842 soldiers were deployed at MAFF's (now Defra) request.

On 23 July it was reported that the Prime Minister stopped payments of the clean-up and disinfectant operation because of the cost (£100,000 average cost of disinfecting a farm in UK compared to £30,000 in Scotland).  He did not mention that provision of these services is a Defra responsibility, rather than the farmer’s.

New licences to allow cattle and pig movements in foot-and-mouth at-risk and high-risk counties were to be available from Monday 24 September from local trading standards authorities. Farmers experienced severe delays in obtaining them, making the commercial and animal welfare problems thousands are already experiencing worse. The government was accused of gross ineptitude when the new arrangements to allow autumn movements of livestock descended into chaos.

Dr Jonathan Birnie, north-east NFU policy adviser, said he does not know of a single farmer who had a licence by the Monday morning.  He said the government's handling of the situation was inept.

By 20^th October 2001 there were 2030 confirmed cases in the UK (compared to 1,260 cases on 12^th April 2001 – despite claims then that the epidemic is under control).  There were no new cases between 17:00 Thursday 18 October and 17:00 Friday 19 October (Last case was on Sunday 30 September 2001).

Of these, Defra claim that most extra cases occurred within so-called dangerous contact culls. These figures are understated – to give just one example, a farmer who farms in Bicester and also near Oxford, 20 miles away, had FMD on both farms: it was counted as one incident and no outbreaks were recorded for Oxford at that time.

Official government statistics put the final death toll as 4.068 million animals slaughtered.  However, the Meat and Livestock Commission claim 10.849 million animals were killed[2].The difference in numbers, over 260%, together with the previous evidence of cover-up, smacks of government distortion of the truth on a massive scale.  The scale of the disaster was epic. 

The disease

FMD is caused by a virus and triggers high temperatures and sores, known as vesicules, in the mouths and on the hooves of animals. Symptoms can include lameness and animals going off their feed. It does not usually kill but traditional methods for stopping the spread are to put down infected animals and isolate farms.

FMD is a highly infectious disease of most farm animals except horses. It is spread in three ways:

• Directly, from an infected animal to another animal, by contact, or through the air.

• Indirectly, from infected animals by people who have handled them.

• Indirectly from infected material such as dung, urine, and saliva picked up by people, vehicles, equipment, dogs, scavenging animals and vermin.

An animal can be infectious for some days before it shows signs of FMD and the signs can go undetected, or are much more difficult to see, in sheep than in cattle and pigs. This makes preventing its spread very difficult.

Although foot-and-mouth disease is extremely unpleasant, causing large blisters on the tongues, lips, hooves and udders of the infected animals, it's not usually fatal. 95% of animals get better within 2-3 weeks although they may be slower growing, less fertile and lame as a result. Only in about 5% cases - generally the very young animals - does the disease cause death - usually in the form of a heart attack.

Only 10% of farmers had insurance cover against the disease: one of the few insurers still offering to renew cover will pay only 25% of the market value of livestock.

12,400 farmers and farm workers lost their jobs despite £1.723bn compensation to the farming industry. The cost to the taxpayer was put at £2.74bn.    Cleansing and disinfection cost £701m.

While the government suggested that the crisis may be coming under control, senior scientists said delay in killing and disposing of carcasses was unacceptable and was prolonging the outbreak. An adviser to the US Department of Agriculture pronounced the killings as misguided and claimed vaccination was a better solution. French ministers called Britain “the weak link” in European agriculture.

Almost a year on, 26 of the 29 mass grave sites at Great Orton are covered.  However, these mass graves leak fluid (“leachate”): some 300,000 litres a day have to be specially treated -  equivalent to the waste from a village[3] .

Despite propaganda, continued closures and movement restrictions had a "devastating impact" on agricultural and tourist income. The tourist industry contributes 4% to the UK's gross domestic product, compared with the 1% contributed by agriculture. Tourism is estimated to be worth about £96 billion a year. align="justify" class="text"

At that time of the year the countryside tourist industry - worth £12 billion a year in England alone - was losing an estimated £100 million a week, and faced a nightmare Easter season as visitors stay away.

Almost two-thirds of people planning an Easter trip to the British countryside cancelled their holiday because of the foot-and-mouth crisis. An internet survey, by an organisation linked to the National Farmers' Union, showed many of those questioned were still unsure what was open to the public and stayed away. Official government figures showed British tourism was devastated by the foot-and-mouth crisis. One hotel in Cumbria saw its bookings fall by 97%. The south-west, one of the worst hit areas, reported income losses of £51m for March, and its tourist board called for additional financial support to help badly affected businesses.

Culture Secretary Chris Smith told cabinet colleagues that income from tourism in parts of Cumbria and Devon was down by as much as 80%, and by 10% overall nationally.

American tourists stayed away from Britain in droves because of the foot-and-mouth crisis, leading to an estimated $3bn loss in trade by Easter.

On 18 October 2001, the government announced a £24m extension to the Business Recovery Fund to help rural economies and small rural businesses damaged by Foot-and-Mouth Disease. 

Tourism Minister Janet Anderson indicated to BBC News Online that cabinet ministers would be spending their holidays in the UK in solidarity with the tourism industry while the disease continued.

She accepted that more needed to be done to speed up the slaughter process with only 50,000 of the 1.5m animals then earmarked for culling on welfare grounds so far processed. 

The final loss to the tourist industry was estimated at £4.25bn.

Suffering to animals was intense:

• Cows went painfully unmilked.

• Animals gave birth unattended, in sodden fields with lambs drowning as they were born.

• Cattle and sheep went un-fed and starved.

• It was not possible to attend to injured animals, who were left to suffer.

If animals had been kept in their current condition before FMD, the RSPCA would have had an open and closed case for prosecution for cruelty leading to fines, imprisonment or both – and yet farmers were banned from moving their animals a few yards to fresh pasture or safety.

In January 2002, Defra formally announced that the FMD epidemic was over.

The medium and long term consequences have yet to be assessed, but they will affect everybody in the UK. Some unexpected dependencies have been exposed. Just a few examples:

The only source of income for some farmers was removed and the average farm income (£57 / hectare) sank even lower, causing bankruptcies and 60 farmer suicides (to put this into context, this is around twice the number who died in the UK Hungerford and Dunblane massacres, which resulted in a law banning handguns).

The British Tourist Authority told BBC News Online that it could take years to return overseas visits to pre-outbreak levels.

Travel agents, airlines, the rail and coach industries were all affected by reduced leisure and business travel.  Just one example: Leeds castle, in Kent, axed 200 jobs.

The postponement of the UK County and General Elections (expected 3^rd May and, on 4^th April postponed until 7^th June) cost up to £10 million in early, aborted and protracted political advertising.  Cancellation costs on poster advertising can be 90%: the choice is effectively to lose the hoarding advertising budget or let the advertising run a month early.  Since farmers represent only 3% of the electorate, their interests came low in the government’s election priorities.

The cost of meat increased and some 30% of the population was said to be considering vegetarianism, having a permanent impact on farm incomes.

9,000 Chinese takeaways and 1,000 Chinese restaurants reported trade down from between 20% to 40% following an unsubstantiated statement that infected swill said to be the cause of FMD outbreak came from a Chinese restaurant. 75% of the 300,000 Chinese living in Britain work in the food trade.

The betting and leisure industries lost millions – the cancellation of the Cheltenham Gold Cup was said to cost the town of Cheltenham some £2-£3 million. Badminton horse trials and the Royal Bath and West Show were cancelled with a similar impact. Betting turnover was said to be down by over £100 million.

Dun & Bradstreet reported UK business failures increased by more than 15% in the second quarter of 2001 – 10,804  bankruptcies, with the largest number in the North East.

Rare breeds have been perfunctorily killed and may be lost for ever.

The Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) stopped farmers using artificial insemination for their cows and banned farmers from buying bulls to service their cows.  No calves, no milk. No milk for the next year, hitting farm incomes and increasing the cost of living as imports compensate.

Angling, a sport enjoyed by over 2 million, was disrupted since many rivers, streams, lakes and canals are on dairy or sheep farmland. Spending in angling venues was greatly reduced with consequent impact on local incomes.

Hunting was cancelled for a season. Hunt servants and the 16,000 jobs depending on fox hunting were placed in jeopardy and, regardless of the anti hunting bill, the demise of hunting may have been hastened.

Many shoots cancelled the 2001 – 2002 season. Breeders of game birds may go bankrupt and the pheasant and partridge population have diminished.  Local hotels suffered from the loss of crucial trade in the winter. The country jobs of beating and picking up ended  – these are not just pin-money jobs, but essential sources of income in some subsistence farming areas of Wales and Scotland.

Hefted (territorial) sheep were culled. It can take generations for their territory to become imprinted on their offspring. The alternatives are that moors and heath return to nature (impenetrable gorse) or become fenced.

Consider a typical dairy farmer – his best income over the last 3 years has been £6,000. He has a wife and three children to keep.  Farmers like him cannot continue.  Small farmers will no longer be able to service the tourist’s countryside: large farming conglomerates will take over. On 11^th April it was reported that the government expect 50,000 small farmers to go out of business and farms to become consolidated. The face of the countryside may be changed for ever and with it a permanent loss of tourists.

Lessons Not Learnt

Almost nothing was learned from the lessons of the 1967 – 68 outbreak of FMD and the subsequent report:

To save £250,000 a year, the unit was disbanded which could have detected the rogue sheep trading that is largely the cause of the disaster – did nobody do an impact analysis?

Contingency plans, drawn up after the 1967-1968 outbreak, were initially ignored and, it is said, not made available to the army until April – two months after the start of the outbreak.

Animal movements were permitted to continue for one to two weeks after the outbreak – doubling the size of the problem.

Red tape prevented vets on the spot from backing their diagnosis and promptly killing sick animals.

Closure of local abattoirs, through over-diligent interpretation of EU red tape, meant animals had to travel further, spreading the disease more quickly and more widely than would otherwise have been the case

Delays were caused by Environmental legislation and lack of coordination between environmental experts, water companies and farmers so that corpses were left unburied for weeks.

Delay in calling in the army led to logistic shambles.

Although the British Veterinary Association offered the help of 500 vets, MAFF turned them down. Vet students were not drafted in for weeks.

Conflicting messages – keep out of the countryside, but the countryside is open – led to the worst of both worlds – possibly contributing to the spread of the disease while strangling tourism.

Protracted timescales between killing animals and disposing of their remains added to the spread of the disease.  Roaming foxes (covering wide distances in the mating season) gorged on the carcasses of infected lambs, dragging parts over long distances. High winds and rain carried infection on the air.  Infection leached with rain and flood water.

Burning of infected carcasses may well have caused the disease to spread on the air.

Political correctness led the government to ignore the offers of help from over one hundred qualified slaughtermen belonging to Hunts, leading to further delays in killing infected animals.

Offers of help from the Countryside Alliance, to provide slaughterers and retired vets, were ignored.

The government failed to learn any of the lessons from the 1996-1997 outbreak.

So, what are the lessons for business continuity? They are clear:

• Without an effective contingency plan, dither and delay compound disaster
• Without prompt, decisive action, losses are compounded
• Clear communication with a consistent message is vital in disaster
• One small disaster (a single case of FMD) can affect hundreds and thousands of businesses and apparent onlookers in different industries and even in countries remote from the original victim.

What can we do to prevent a recurrence?

• Reinstate preventative surveillance – an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure (and is a great deal cheaper)
• Update the contingency plans, maintain them and make sure everybody relevant knows that they exist and where they are
• Waste no time in tackling the outbreak: have a proper escalation process to ensure the contingency plans are invoked immediately
• Call in resource immediately: strike quick and hard
• Listen to vets – do not allow ministries to procrastinate and delay
• At the first hint of procrastination, hand over to the army
• Use all the resource that is available – the rural, tourist and leisure economies are too important to allow petty politics to lay the countryside to waste.

Will governments learn?  Sadly, the track record is that they do not.

© Andrew Hiles 2002

Director, Kingswell International

[1] Sunday Telegraph 17 February 2002, p 15.

[2] The SundayTelegraph 17 February 2002, p14

[3]ibid p15